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Abstract
The United States has ratified various treaties impinging on
traditional areas of state concern. Recently, in a nod to federalism, the
federal government has adopted practices excusing the states from
complying with some of these treaties. These practices have put the
United States in violation of treaty obligations and are in tension with
principles of international law.
While there is extensive scholarship recommending changes to U.S.
law that would potentially balance state interests and treaty obligations,
few scholars have looked to solutions found in other federally organized
nations. Recent reforms in Australia allow its states to consult with the
Commonwealth government before treaties affecting state interests are
ratified. This article argues that adopting aspects of the Australian
reforms in the United States would alleviate the current U.S. tension with
international law by giving states a role in treaty making that does not
prevent the federal government from meeting treaty obligations.
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Introduction
Throughout U.S. history, the interests of the states' have often
conflicted with treaty obligations.2 Traditionally, however, U.S. law has
been a strict parent and suppressed this conflict by asserting that, as far
as treaties are concerned, states should neither be seen nor heard.3
Adopting a more progressive parenting technique, the U.S. federal
government, in a nod to the principles of federalism, has recently
allowed the states to make their presence felt in the realm of treaty
compliance in two ways. First, the executive branch and the Senate have
attached statements to treaties indicating that the federal government will
1. In order to avoid confusion, and based on the model provided by Edward T.
Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 404
n.1 (2003) [hereinafter Swaine, Does Federalism], this article uses the terms "states,"
"territories," and "sub-units" to refer to subnational governments and "nations,'
"countries," "Commonwealth government" and "federal government" to refer to nation-
states or national governments.
2. David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of
the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075, 1077 (2000)
(outlining the reoccurrence of the debate throughout American history).
3. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the States
Control Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457, 459-60 (2004)
(presenting but not agreeing with the proposition and citing, e.g., Zchemig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429, 441 (1968); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); Chae Chan
Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)); Swaine,
Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 1 (presenting but not agreeing with the proposition);
Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty
Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1129 n.1 (2000) [hereinafter Swaine, Negotiating
Federalism] (citing for the proposition, but not agreeing with, e.g. LoUis -ENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 150 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS]). For a discussion of the numerous ways states have historically
exerted and continue to exert some control over compliance with treaties, see Ku, supra,
at 476-526.
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implement its obligations under the treaties only as far as the federal
system allows and that additional implementation will be left to the
states.4  These statements are known as federalism reservations.5
Second, the federal government allowed the states to heavily influence
the enforcement of certain International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ)
orders stemming from treaty violations.6 Like the best efforts of many
well-meaning parents, these more tolerant practices have failed to resolve
the underlying conflict and have created fresh problems. They only
marginally protect the principles of federalism and turn out to be in
serious tension with international law.
The U.S. practice of unilaterally attaching federalism reservations to
multilateral treaties has historic roots7 but has been used most
significantly in three human rights treaties ratified within the last twenty
years.8 The U.S. executive branch and Senate attached reservations to
these treaties because of concerns that treaty obligations might interfere
with areas of traditional state concern. 9 These reservations have two
important components. First, they declare the attached treaties to be non-
self executing, ° meaning that they must be implemented before going
4. See infra notes 7-13 and accompanying text; see also Ku, supra note 3, at 521-
26.
5. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1273 (using the term "federalism
reservations"). These reservations are also called federalism understandings, Ku, supra
note 3, at 522 (using the term "federalism understanding" and distinguishing it from
"federal reservation"), and federalism RUDs (an acronym for reservations,
understandings, and declarations), Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 442 (using
the term "federalism RUDs"). This article uses the term "federalism reservation" to
indicate any treaty reservation directly aimed at making accommodations for federal
systems of government.
6. See infra notes 17-30 and accompanying text; see also Ku, supra note 3, at 510-
21.
7. Although unilateral reservations to multilateral treaties were not embraced by
international law until the 1950s, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties,
Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399, 431 (2000) [hereinafter
Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent], the United States had a history of
negotiating for federalism reservations in bilateral treaties, id. at 409-10, and a
constitutional amendment requiring the use of federalism reservations came relatively
close to being passed in the 1950s. Id. at 412-13.
8. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984 (ratified in 1994), 23 I.L.M. 1027,
revised 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (ratified in 1988) [hereinafter
ICCPR]; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (ratified in 1994). Curtis A. Bradley and
Jack L. Goldsmith cite these treaties and ratification dates in the context of demonstrating
the U.S. practice of using reservations to treaties generally and for federalism purposes,
Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 416.
9. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 416.
10. See U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 Cong. Rec.
2005]
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into effect. I" Second, they proclaim that the treaties "shall be
implemented by the federal government to the extent that it exercises
jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state
and local governments."' 2 These reservations bring states into the treaty
process by, on their face, allowing states to choose whether to implement
any of the treaty provisions that affect areas of state concern. 3 State
interests, however, are only partially served by this practice because the
federal government can, on a whim, decide not to attach any reservations
to a treaty. 14  This is not the only drawback to the reservations. By
giving the choice of implementing certain treaty obligations to the states,
the U.S. federal government seems to have waived responsibility for
those obligations. Because of this apparent waiver, the federalism
reservations potentially violate international law.15 Furthermore, they are
S7634 III (daily ed. June 24, 1994) [hereinafter Race Convention reservations]; U.S.
Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. S4784 III(1) (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992)
[hereinafter ICCPR reservations]; U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to
Ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 136 Cong. Rec. S17492 111(1) (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990)
[hereinafter Torture Convention reservations]; see also Bradley & Goldsmith,
Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 416 n.87 (citing these reservations generally and
providing directions to the University of Minnesota's excellent web site which provides
their text, http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/usres.html) (last visited June 20, 2005).
11. Ku, supra note 3, at 462. The default rule in the United States is that treaties are
self-executing, meaning they come into legal force as soon as they are ratified. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111
(1987) (explaining that courts must give direct effect to international law and that treaties
are only "non-self executing" under special conditions). Although "self-executing"
treaties are legally binding and can be upheld in court, some form of active
implementation may still be required in order to meet the specific obligations of the
treaty. See Ku, supra note 3, at 508 (discussing state implementation of self-executing
treaties); see infra note 97 and accompanying text.
12. Race Convention reservations, supra note 10, at II; see also ICCPR
reservations, supra note 10, at 11(5); Torture Convention reservations, supra note 10, at
11(5).
13. See Ku, supra note 3, at 525 (stating that non-self-execution clauses preclude
judicial enforcement and that states are likely left with jurisdiction over the treaty with
which the federal government cannot interfere). Whether the federalism reservations
succeed in leaving the choice to implement treaties to the states is, as a legal matter, hotly
debated. While Professors Bradley and Goldsmith have defended the legal validity of the
reservations, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 401-02, others contend that they serve
no legal purpose because the U.S. federal government has jurisdiction over all matters
arising under a treaty. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights
Treaties: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 346 (1995) [hereinafter,
Henkin, Ghost].
14. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 415-16
(explaining that the executive branch and the Senate have the choice whether to attach
federalism reservations to treaties).
15. For example, according to Professor M. CherifBassiouni:
"Good faith" is a basic requirement in the law of treaties, and a "reservation" or
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generally disfavored in treaty talks because negotiating nations view
them as illegitimate attempts by federal nations to reduce their
obligations under the proposed treaties. 
16
The conflict between state interests and treaty obligations has been
particularly bitter in reference to a series of binding ICJ orders based on
U.S. violations of treaty obligations under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (hereinafter VCCR). 17 The ICJ orders have required
the like which expressly holds that the treaty at issue does not impose any duty
on the United States to enact implementing legislation that may be contrary to
the Constitution as interpreted by domestic law and judicial interpretations
violates that basic principle. For all practical purposes, this "reservation"
leaves the United States free from any legal obligation under the ICCPR
whenever, in its sole discretion, it decides not to implement it legislatively. In
fact, this "reservation" allows Congress, at any time, to pass a law contrary to
an ICCPR provision and have it supersede the treaty. Also, it allows any
federal judge to hold that a given statute or court decision supersedes the
ICCPR.
This open-ended approach to treaties is incompatible with international law,
much as it is incompatible with common sense and good judgment.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights by the United States, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1169, 1179-80 (1993)
(footnotes omitted); see also Henkin, Ghost, supra note 13, at 344. Contra Bradley &
Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 423-39 (evaluating Bassiouni's and
Henkin's arguments and concluding that, despite various concerns, unilateral reservations
to treaties do not violate international law).
16. Attachment C-Principles and Procedures for Commonwealth-State
Consultation on Treaties 1 8.1, Council of Australian Governments' Communiqu6 14
June 1996 [hereinafter Principles and Procedures], http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/
140696/attachment_c.htn; Brian R. Opeskin, International Law and Federal States, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FEDERALISM 1, 15-17 (1997) (describing general resistance to
federalism reservations and specifically to those proposed by the United States and
Australia for the ICCPR) [hereinafter Opeskin, Federal States]. But see Opeskin,
Federal States, supra, at 19 (citing Gillian Triggs, Australia's Ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Endorsement or Repudiation?, 31
INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 278, 292 (1982), for the proposition that in some cases non-federal
states may agree to federalism reservations in order to encourage wider accession to a
treaty).
17. Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Mar. 31, 2004), 43 I.L.M.
581 (2004) [hereinafter Avena Final Order], available at http://www.icj-cij.org; Avena
and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Provisional Measures Order of Feb. 5,
2003) [hereinafter Avena Provisional Measures Order], http://www.icj-cij.org; LaGrand
(F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Provisional Measures Order of Mar. 3) [hereinafter
LaGrand Provisional Measures Order], available at http://www.icj-cij.org; Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.) (Provisional Measures Order), 1998
I.C.J. 248 (April 9) [hereinafter VCCR Provisional Measures Order], available at
http://www.icj-cij.org. ICJ final orders are binding under the terms of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, arts. 38(1), 59, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060; 33
U.N.T.S. 993, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/
ibasicstatute.htm#CHAPTER_II, to which the United States and all signatories of the UN
Charter are parties, see Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 266 n.78 (2d
ed. 1996). See also, e.g., Sanja Djajic, The Effect of International Court of Justice
Decisions on Municipal Courts in the United States: Breard v. Green, 23 HASTINGS INT'L
20051
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the stay of executions 18 and the review of convictions and sentencing of
certain foreign nationals in the United States.19 Regarding the orders
staying executions, the U.S. federal government under President Clinton
pursued a course of action that was sensitive to federalism concerns. The
government argued that it could not interfere with state criminal
proceedings 20 and limited its enforcement of the orders to functionally
non-binding communiquds and letters requesting state compliance.21
State response to these requests was mixed,22 and executions in Virginia
& COMP. L. REV. 27, 40 (1999) (stating that ICJ rulings are binding on states). The status
of the provisional measures issued in some of the VCCR disputes was uncertain until
more recently, LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (June 27, 2001), 40 I.L.M. 1069, 1096 109
(2001) [hereinafter LaGrand Final Order] (ICJ ruling that provisional measures are
binding), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
18. Avena Provisional Measures Order, supra note 17, 59; LaGrand Provisional
Measures Order, supra note 17, at 16 T 29; VCCR Provisional Measures Order, supra
note 17, at 258 41.
19. Avena Final Order, supra note 17, at 619 1 138-41 (ordering review and
reconsideration beyond what is available in the clemency process).
20. In the federal government's Amicus Curiae Brief to Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S.
371 (1998), a U.S. Supreme Court case arising out of the same facts as the ICJ VCCR
case, "[t]he Solicitor General stated ... to the Supreme Court that the 'federal system
imposes limits on the federal government's ability to interfere with the criminal justice
systems of the States. The measures at the United States' disposal under our Constitution
may in some cases include only persuasion ... ' Ku, supra note 3, at 513, (quoting
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371
(1998) (No. 97-8214 (A97-732) (internal quotations omitted)).
21. In response to the VCCR Provisional Measures Order, supra note 17, Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright wrote Virginia Governor James Gilmore requesting that he
abide by the ICJ order and stay the execution of Angel Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan
national. Ku, supra note 3, at 512 & n.278. In response to the LaGrand Provisional
Measures Order, supra note 17, the ICJ order was merely forwarded to the Governor of
Arizona. See LaGrand Case, Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, at 4.169
(F.R.G. v. U.S.) (Sept. 16, 1999) (cited by Ku, supra note 3, at 512 n.278),
http://www.icj-cij.org. The response to the recent ICJ decision in Avena and other
Mexican Nationals, supra note 17, requiring review and reconsideration of the cases of
Mexican nationals who were denied their consular notification rights, has been similar.
In anticipation of the pending Oklahoma execution of Mexican national Osbaldo Torres
Aguilera, U.S. Department of State Legal Advisor William H. Taft IV wrote Oklahoma
Governor Brad Henry and the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board requesting that they
give "careful consideration" to Torres' clemency request. Sean D. Murphy,
Implementation of the Avena Decision by Oklahoma Court, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 581, 582 &
nn.7 & 9 (2004) (citing and providing key passages from the letters).
22. After receiving letters from U.S. Department of State Legal Advisor William H.
Taft IV, see supra note 21, Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry commuted the sentence of a
Mexican national from death to life in prison. Murphy, supra note 21, at 582. In
response to the VCCR Provisional Measures Order, supra note 17, however, the
Governor of Virginia denied the Secretary of State's request for a stay, see supra note 21,
and executed Breard as planned. See Jonathan I. Charney & W. Michael Reisman,
Agora: Breard: The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 666, 674 (reprinting Governor Gilmore's
statement outlining why he did not grant Breard clemency). Similarly, in the LaGrand
case, Arizona went ahead with its execution of German national Walter LaGrand.
LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (June 27, 2001), 40 I.L.M. 1069, 1079 T 34 (2001), available at
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and Arizona put the United States in violation of international law.23
President George W. Bush's response to the ICJ's review orders has
been no more satisfying. Although Bush insisted the VCCR did not
apply to Texas when he was Governor,24 and has made strong comments
in favor of federalism, 25 as President he issued a memorandum ordering
state courts to review the sentencing of foreign nationals as required by
the ICJ. 26  This action, however, does not mean that the Bush
http://www.icj-cij.org.
23. LaGrand Final Order, supra note 17, at 1102 5 (ICJ ruling that U.S. failure to
take all measures at its disposal to stay Arizona execution of LaGrand was a breach of
U.S. obligations). Paraguay withdrew its case against the U.S. once Virginia executed
Breard, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426
(Discontinuance Order of Nov. 10), available at http:// www.icj-cij.org, but the facts
indicate a similar result to that in LaGrand had the case gone forward. To be fair, there
was some question as to whether ICJ provisional measures were binding under
international law when the executions took place, LaGrand Final Order, supra note 17, at
1092 99.
24. See, e.g., Al Kamen, Virtually Blushing, WASH. POST, June 23, 1997 at A17
(quoting general counsel Alberto R. Gonzalez as saying "[s]ince the State of Texas is not
a signatory to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations .... we believe it is
inappropriate to ask Texas to determine whether a breach of [the treaty] occurred in
connection with the arrest and conviction of Mr. Montoya.") (cited by Peter J. Spiro, The
States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 567, 588 (1997), for the
proposition that sub-national governments fail to consider international law in decision-
making).
25. E.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at National
Governors' Association Meeting (Feb. 26, 2001) ("I'm going to make respect for
federalism a priority in this administration. Respect for federalism begins with an
understanding of its philosophy. The framers of the Constitution did not believe in an all-
knowing, all-powerful federal government. They believed that our freedom is best
preserved when power is dispersed. That is why they limited and enumerated the federal
government's powers, and reserved the remaining functions of government to the
states."), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/02/20010226-8.html (last
visited June 20, 2005).
26. The memorandum reads in part:
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that the United
States will discharge its international obligations under the decision of the [ICJ]
in the [Avena case], by having State courts give effect to the decision in
accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican
nationals addressed in that decision.
U.S. President George W. Bush: Memorandum for the U.S. Attomey-General Regarding
Compliance with the Decision of the International Court of Justice in Avena (February
28, 2005) (referring to the Avena Final Order, supra note 17) [hereinafter Avena
Memorandum], available at http://brownwelsh.com/Archive/2005-03-10_Avena_
compliance.pdf (last visited June 20, 2005); see Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 9, Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-5928 (S. Ct. argued Mar. 28, 2005) ("[I]n the
exercise of his constitutionally based foreign affairs power, and his authority under the
United Nations Charter, the President has determined that compliance should be achieved
by the enforcement of the ICJ decision in state courts in accordance with principles of
comity. That presidential determination, like an executive agreement, has independent
legal force and effect, and contrary state rules must give way under the Supremacy
2005]
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administration is more concerned with international law and order than
with federalism. At about the same time as plans regarding the review
orders were made public, the federal government announced its
withdrawal from the provisions of the VCCR that allow disputes arising
under it to be heard by the ICJ. 27 Considering that, in order to resolve the
Iran hostage crisis, the United States was the first country to appeal to the
ICJ under its VCCR jurisdiction,28 this is a substantial sacrifice
presumably made on behalf of the states in order to insulate them from
future ICJ rulings. The courts continue to confront cases arising from the
ICJ review orders,29 and the states are likely to challenge Bush's order
requiring state court review of sentencing. 30 The ongoing conflict is
disturbing evidence that the federal government has yet to find a
satisfactory method of reconciling state interests and treaty obligations.
To unsettle matters even more, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued a
bevy of recent opinions that signal potential constitutional limits on the
federal government's ability to impose treaty obligations on the states.31
Clause."), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme-Court/briefs/04-5928/04-
5928.mer.ami.usa.html (last visited June 20, 2005); see also Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It
Has Withdrawn From World Judicial Body, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at A16, available
at 2005 WLNR 3685583.
27. Liptak, supra note 26, at A16; see United States Department of State, Bureau of
Consular Affairs, Announcement: All Consular Notification Requirements Remain in
Effect, http://travel.state.gov/news/news_2155.html.
28. See Supreme Court to Hear Case of Mexican National on Death Row in
Connection With Alleged US Treaty Violations (National Public Radio Morning Edition
radio broadcast, Mar. 28, 2005) (citing Ambassador Thomas Pickering for the proposition
that ICJ helped pave the way for the freeing of the hostages) [hereinafter Supreme Court
to Hear]; see generally Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (U.S. v. Iran) (Provisional Measures Order of Dec. 15, 1979), 1979 I.C.J. 7,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
29. Most recently, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion finding it had
improvidently granted certiorari in regards to a petition for relief based on the ICJ's
Avena Final Order, supra note 17, filed by a Mexican inmate on death row in Texas.
Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088, No. 04-5928 (May 23, 2005) (per curiam). The
Court based its decision on the "possibility that the Texas courts will provide Medellin
with the review he seeks pursuant to the Avena judgment and the President's
memorandum [supra note 26], and the potential for review in this Court once the Texas
courts have heard and decided Medellin's pending action." Id. at 6. The Court
previously struck down similar pleas, stating that inmates were procedurally barred from
bringing claims under the VCCR at any time after trial. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371,
376-77 (1998).
30. Supreme Court to Hear, supra note 28 (quoting the Texas Attorney General as
saying, "[w]e respectfully believe the executive determination exceeds the constitutional
bounds for federal authority."); see Liptak, supra note 26, at A16 (citing a spokesman for
the Texas Attorney General, and concluding that "Texas prosecutors have not conceded
that the president has the power to force state courts to reopen the Medellin case.").
31. Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 415-41 (citing the Supreme Court's
recent federalism jurisprudence, embodied in such cases as United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000), Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), Printz v. United States, 521
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These limits would likely make it extremely difficult for the United
States to comply with international obligations.32 Since there are rarely
concrete ramifications for treaty violations, 33 the United States would not
suffer too greatly by placing federalism ahead of treaty obligations. The
federal government, however, has expressed commitment to its
international obligations generally and the VCCR in particular.34 Issues
of reciprocity and the maintenance of good bargaining relations are
enough to justify this commitment,35 and, in the best of all worlds, the
U.S. 898 (1997), City of Boerne v. Flores, 421 U.S. 507 (1997), Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), as potentially limiting the federal government's
treaty power).
32. Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 408 (stating that, "[s]hould any of this
come to pass [referring to the application of the Supreme Court's federalism rulings to
the treaty power], the new federalism will have placed the United States in violation of its
treaty obligations").
33. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty
Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 196 (1998) (stating that "[o]f course, international law
generally is not.., subject to supranational enforcement mechanisms, and as a practical
matter is... subject to violation on a regular basis," but listing other consequences);
Carlos Manuel Vizquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 695, 713 ("Treaty obligations might be thought by some to be 'precatory' as a general
matter because effective international enforcement mechanisms are lacking.")
[hereinafter V6zquez, Self-Executing Treaties].
34. In regards international law generally, consider statements from the George W.
Bush administration regarding the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.
E.g., Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, Press Briefing (June 22, 2004) ("President
Bush knows his most important job is to protect this nation. At the same time, he's made
it clear, in the war against al Qaeda and its supporters, the United States will follow its
treaty obligations and U.S. law, both of which prohibit the use of torture. And this has
been firm U.S. policy since the outset of this administration and it remains our policy
today."), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040622-14.html; Scott
McClellan, White House Press Secretary, Press Gaggle (May 17, 2004) ("But our policy
is clear. The United States policy is that we comply with all our laws and with our-and
with our treaty obligations. And that is our policy."),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/20040517-7.html; Colin L. Powell,
U.S. Secretary of State, Interview on ABC's This Week with George Stephanopoulos
(June 13, 2004) ("He was-the President believed, and he has said this, that he would
follow all obligations, because he felt he was bound by those obligations.... And his
instructions to us consistently were to follow our obligations under international treaties
and other constraints that applied to our activities."), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
rm/33474.htm. Regarding the VCCR, see Letter from Madeleine K. Albright, U.S.
Secretary of State, to James S. Gilmore III, Governor of Virginia (Apr. 13, 1998)
(reprinted in Chamey & Reisman, supra note 22, at 671-72) (stating that "[tihe execution
of Mr. Breard in the present circumstance could lead some countries to contend
incorrectly that the U.S. does not take seriously its obligations under the [VCCR]")
[hereinafter Albright Letter].
35. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 51-54 (2d ed.
1979) [hereinafter HENKIN, How NATIONS] (discussing the foreign policy reasons nations
have for complying with international law); see also Heather M. Heath, Non-Compliance
with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and its Effect on Reciprocity for
United States Citizens Abroad, 17 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) (indicating concern
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United States would develop a treaty-making and compliance process
that encompasses its federal system of government without sacrificing
international law.36
The observation that federal systems of government and compliance
with international law do not always go hand-in-hand is not new,37 and it
is no surprise that other federal nations have faced problems balancing
state interests and international obligations.38 Over the last thirty years,
one federally organized nation in particular, Australia, which is
composed of six states and two territories, 39 has adopted procedural
reforms designed to address this issue by developing a role for states in
its treaty-making process in a manner that does not undermine
compliance with treaty obligations.40 In a nutshell, Australia has
about U.S. citizens' consular notification rights abroad because of failure of United States
to meet VCCR obligations); Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 408-10 (citing
HENKIN, How NATIONS, supra, and discussing the negative bargaining effects for the
United States if it appears unable to enforce international law against the states); Albright
Letter, supra note 34, at 672 (same as Heath, supra).
36. For the purposes of this Article, references to treaty making refer to the steps in
the treaty process before ratification.
37. See Brian R. Opeskin & Donald R. Rothwell, The Impact of Treaties on
Australian Federalism, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1995) (quoting K.C. WHEARE,
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 186 (4th ed. 1963) and New South Wales v. Commonwealth
(1975) 135 C.L.R. 337, 445 (Stephen, J.)) [hereinafter Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of
Treaties].
38. For example, local state opposition has hindered India's implementation of the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, the Agreement on the
International Trade of Tropical Timber, and the World Heritage Convention. Ronald J.
Herring & Erach Barusha, Embedded Capacities: India's Compliance with International
Environmental Accords, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDs 395, 396-97 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold
K. Jacobsen eds., 1998). Similarly, Canada's federal system has prevented total
implementation of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, with
only three provinces enforcing the treaty's side agreement, Joseph DiMento,
International Environmental Law: A Global Assessment, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,387,
10,421 n.321 (2003) (examining the record as of June 2002).
39. For simplicity, this article generally refers to both the states and territories as
"states." The six states are New South Wales, Tasmania, Queensland, South Australia,
Victoria, and Western Australia. The two internal territories are the Northern Territory
and the Australian Capital Territory. Australia also has a number of external territories,
but the internal territories have self-governing status like the states, and, despite some
constitutional differences, are for most purposes essentially the same as the states.
Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 1 n.4.
40. Australia's Commonwealth government has had a commitment to territory
involvement in the early stages of the treaty-making process since 1977, see Opeskin &
Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 14, and initially adopted formal
procedures for accomplishing it in 1983, see Australian Senate Legal and Constitutional
References Committee, Trick or Treaty? Commonwealth Power to Make and Implement
Treaties 13.19 (1995) [hereinafter Trick or Treaty?], http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/
other/dfat/reports/tortcon.html (last visited June 20, 2005), with the most recent revision
coming in 1996. Principles and Procedures, supra note 16; see Hilary Charlesworth et
al., Deep Anxieties: Australia and the International Legal Order, 25 SYDNEY L. REV.
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reconciled its central authority with the autonomy of its states by
adopting procedures that give the territories an official but non-binding
advisory role in the treaty-making process. 41 This caters to federalism by
giving states a platform to voice misgivings about treaties that infringe
on their traditional areas of concern. With this platform, states can put
political pressure on the federal government to either modify those
treaties or not ratify them at all.42 This arrangement, however, does not
alter the federal government's supremacy in foreign affairs, and it retains
power over the states to uphold international law and any treaties that
have been adopted.43
The goal of this article is to examine Australian reforms and
evaluate whether they represent a viable option in the U.S. legal and
political environment for reconciling federalism and the international law
of treaties. 44 While there is a mountain of scholarship examining the
appropriate role of federalism in U.S. treaty relations and proposing
methods for its incorporation,45 few scholars have looked to solutions
423,439-40 (2003).
41. Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, 5.
42. See Treaty Making-The People's Process, Joint Committee on Treaties, Proof
Committee Hansard, Brisbane, July 20, 2000, at 7 (statement of Hon. Alexander Downer,
Minister of Foreign Affairs) (explaining that under the reforms, the federal government
"would obviously try to get a consensus amongst the states and the territories before
ratifying a treaty which is of relevance to them.") [hereinafter The People's Process],
http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/joint/commttee/j 1026.pdf (last visited June 20, 2005).
43. See Donald R. Rothwell, International Law and Legislative Power, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FEDERALISM 104, 124 (1997) ("through the High Court's
expansive interpretation of Commonwealth powers it has been possible for the
Government to initiate and for Parliament to enact legislation designed to give effect to
international law. This legislative capacity has been an important element in ensuring
that Australia has been able to play an active and responsible role in international
affairs."); see also Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 12 ("The
upshot of the High Court's interpretation of federal legislative power over external affairs
is that Parliament does not lack power to implement treaties to which Australia is or
intends to become a party, whatever their subject matter.").
44. It should be noted that the scope of this article is limited to treaties and does not
attempt to include an analysis of international agreements made by sole executive
agreement or congressional-executive agreement. For a discussion of these types of
agreements and federalism issues raised by them, see David Sloss, International
Agreements and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55 STAN L. REv. 1963 (2003).
45. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97
MICH. L. REv. 390 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Power Part 1]; Curtis A. Bradley,
The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98, 100-01
(2000) (proposing that Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), should be overturned
and that Congress's power to implement treaties should be limited by the federalism
considerations that have limited its power in other arenas) [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty
Power Part II]; Ku, supra note 3, at 532-33 (finding that U.S. states already play an
important role in implementing international law and that their continued involvement
potentially brings greater political legitimacy for, and U.S. involvement in, international
law); Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for
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found in other federally organized nations.46 Even though comparative
federalism has been dismissed as an impossible mixing of apples and
oranges,47  it "may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem-in this
case the problem of reconciling central authority with the need to
preserve the liberty-enhancing autonomy of a smaller constituent
governmental entity. '48 The Australian reforms giving states an advisory
role are of particular interest for the United States because they echo the
Framers' original intent of requiring state advice and consent in treaty
making. 49 Furthermore, the historically analogous roles for U.S. and
Australian states in federal treaty making provide an additional impetus
to examine the applicability of the Australian reforms. 50
Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 245, 288-89
(2001) (encouraging inter-governmental cooperation between the states and federal
government in implementing international human rights treaties); Swaine, Does
Federalism, supra note 1, at 499-532 ("reviving" compacts between U.S. states and
foreign nations as a method of incorporating states into foreign affairs). For exhaustive
historical support for the view that states have no formal place in foreign affairs, see
Golove, supra note 2, at 1079-81.
46. A notable exception is provided by Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Affairs of
Federal Systems: A National Perspective on the Benefits of State Participation, 46 VILL.
L. REv. 1015, 1053-57 (2001) [hereinafter Halberstam, Foreign Affairs] (weighing the
benefits for the United States of EU/German style state participation in foreign affairs).
47. In Printz v. New York, Justice Scalia deemed "such comparative analysis
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite
relevant to the task of writing one.... The fact is that our federalism is not Europe's."
Printz v. New York, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (as quoted by Neil Colman McCabe,
"Our Federalism, "Not Theirs: Judicial Comparative Federalism in the U.S., 40 S. TEX.
L. REv. 541, 543 (1999)). Professor Swaine makes a different but related point in
examining the various approaches federal nations take toward interpreting their
constitutions in reference to international law, stating that it is "hazardous to generalize
about federal systems at all." Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 463-66.
48. Printz, 521 U.S. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (comparing EU/German and U.S.
approaches to the implementation of federal laws at the constituent government level).
49. The Constitution requires the "Advice and Consent" of the Senate in treaty
making, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and, prior to the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913,
Senators were appointed by state legislatures and were regarded as representing state
interests in the treaty process. Robert Anderson IV, "Ascertained in a Different Way":
The Treaty Power at the Crossroads of Contract, Compact, and Constitution, 69 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 189, 231-32 (2001). As part of "Advice and Consent," many Framers
imagined the Senate taking an active advisory role in treaty negotiations, although this
practice was dismissed almost immediately in favor of consent alone. Bradley &
Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 405-06; see infra notes 55-56 and
accompanying text.
50. Before reform, Australian states were in the same situation as U.S. states after
the Seventeenth Amendment, see supra note 49 and infra Part I, and had no formal role
(advisory or otherwise) in the treaty-making decisions of the executive branch. See Trick
or Treaty?, supra note 40, at 13.19 (describing introduction in 1977 of guidelines for
giving states a role in treaty making). This is in contrast to German and EU systems,
where constituent governments are formally represented in the treaty process. See The
Law Library of Congress, Directorate of Legal Research, National Treaty Powers and
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Part I of this article analyzes the historical role of U.S. states in
treaty making and the potential legal changes that might alter that role.
Part I also briefly considers and critiques some of the current academic
proposals for incorporating federalism in U.S. foreign affairs. Part II
compares federalism in pre-reform Australian foreign affairs to the
historical situation in the United States. Part II continues by describing
the recent procedural changes and examining the results of those
reforms. Part III analyzes the appropriateness of the Australian reforms
for the United States by examining the practical and legal consequences
of adopting the reforms. The article concludes that although wholesale
U.S. adoption of the Australian reforms would be impractical because of
the far greater number of states within the U.S. than in Australia,
incorporating some of the reforms would be an attractive method for
including federalism in U.S. foreign affairs.
I. State Involvement in the U.S. Treaty-making Process
The Framers addressed the question of the appropriate role of states
in the treaty process when they adopted the U.S. Constitution.51 Because
state interference in foreign affairs had nearly driven the country to war
under the Articles of Confederation,52 the Framers designed the
Constitution to give the federal government supremacy in all treaty
matters.53 In order to accomplish this, the Constitution generally excises
the states from foreign affairs.54 The Framers, however, attempted to
create balance by giving states an advise-and-consent role in the treaty
Implementation 32, 49 (LL File No. 2004-825); see also Daniel Halberstam,
Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in THE FEDERAL VISION:
LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN
UNION 213, 235-36 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds. 2001) (explaining role of
Member States and La.nder generally in law making processes) [hereinafter Halberstam,
Comparative Federalism]. This article does not meant to overstate the similarity between
U.S. and Australian systems; important distinctions remain. See infra Part II (comparing
the two systems in greater depth).
51. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1102.
52. Id. at 1115-16 (discussing tensions created by state refusal to comply with
stipulations of the 1782 Treaty of Peace with Great Britain).
53. Id. at 1103-04; 1132.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. ("No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation ... "); see U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. ("This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."); see also U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur .. "). Article X, Section 10, Clause 3 leaves the door open for states to form
"compacts" with foreign nations, but only with Congress's consent. For more on state-
foreign compacts, see infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
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process. Contrary to their intentions, states as a rule no longer participate
in treaty making.
Under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, the Framers gave the treaty-
making power to the President "by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate... provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." At
the founding, Senators were appointed by state legislatures and thus, at
least in the Framers' conception, represented state interests when
considering treaties. 55 The Framers' intent was that Senators would
actively advise the President during treaty negotiations and possess the
power to reject a treaty by refusing consent.56 The Framers' intentions,
however, were stymied almost immediately when the George
Washington administration abandoned the practice of seeking Senate
advice during treaty negotiations.57
State ability to consent to or reject treaties through representation in
the Senate fared better, lasting until the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment in 1913 .58 The Seventeenth Amendment requires the
popular election of Senators and thus eliminated the Senate's traditional
role as protecting the concerns of state institutions. 59 Because Senators
55. Anderson, supra note 49, at 231-32. (citing James Madison, among others).
56. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra
note 7, at 405 (citing RALSTON HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES 1789-1817 (1920),
among others, for the proposition that "[m]any of the Founders believed that the advice
function required that the President consult with the Senate prior to negotiating and
signing a treaty"). Ralston Hayden reports that active consultation during treaty
negotiation was the original intent of the Washington administration and Senate.
HAYDEN, supra at 103-04.
57. HAYDEN, supra note 56, at 104 ("In the end it became [Washington's] custom
merely to inform the Senate of the proposed negotiation upon securing its consent to the
nomination of the agent, and to submit the latter's instructions only with the completed
treaty."); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 405-06
(citing Hayden). Professor Bradley argues that the Senate adopted conditional consent in
order to fulfill its advisory role. Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note
7, at 406. Regardless, state "advice" in the form of conditional consent was, like state
"consent," superceded by the Seventeenth Amendment. See infra text accompanying
notes 58-61.
58. Anderson, supra note 49, at 231-32; Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back
into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 215, 224 (2000)
[hereinafter Kramer, Putting Politics] (stating that the Seventeenth Amendment
eliminated "the one feature of the Senate that really might have protected states, the
power of state legislators to choose Senators"). Professor Kramer argues that Senate
concern with federalism issues probably dried up even before the Seventeenth
Amendment because Senators' long terms insulated them from effective review by state
legislatures. Kramer, Putting Politics, supra at 224 n.33. Professor Golove argues that
the Senate continues to represent state interests by obstructing treaties, but Swaine
convincingly challenges that argument, explaining that obstructionism has "no necessary
connection with any genuine commitment to federalism." Swaine, Does Federalism,
supra note 1, at 413 n.31 (citing Golove, supra note 2, at 1294-99).
59. Anderson, supra note 49, at 232.
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are elected at the state level, they continue to be somewhat guided by
state concerns but have no incentive to protect the states from federal
action. As Professor Larry D. Kramer explains:
[I]f we assume that members of Congress elected on the basis of
geography respond to state and local interests, doesn't this, in turn,
give them an incentive to reduce or minimize the role of state and
local government? Federal politicians will want to earn the support
and affection of local constituents by providing desired services
themselves-through the federal government-rather than to give or
share credit with state officials. State officials are rivals, not allies, a
fact the Framers understood and the reason they made Senators
directly beholden to state legislators in the first place.
60
Thus, even though the Seventeenth Amendment does not entirely erase
state concerns from consideration in the Senate, it in "no way means that
federal lawmakers will choose not to preempt state law or not to displace
the political authority of state institutions.'
The courts have also limited the state voice in foreign affairs. The
Supreme Court explicitly stated that states do not exist in relation to
foreign affairs in its 1937 United States v. Belmont decision.62 Belmont
arose from the following facts: In 1918, the Soviet Union nationalized a
number of its corporations.63 One of these corporations had a deposit
account with Belmont, a private banker in New York. In 1933, the
Soviet Union assigned, via an international compact, its interest in the
account (and numerous other assets) to the United States.64 Under the
agreement, the United States would inform the Soviet Union of all
amounts that it realized under the assignment.65 The goal of the
agreement was to bring about settlement of rival claims between the two
countries.66 The appellate court held that the assignment violated a New
York policy prohibiting enforcement of confiscatory degrees issued by
foreign governments. 67  The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
however, and held that "[i]n respect of all international negotiations and
compacts, and in respect of foreign affairs generally, state lines
disappear. As to such purposes the state of New York does not exist.,
68
60. Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1510-11
(1994).
61. Kramer, Putting Politics, supra note 58, at 224-25.
62. 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); Ku, supra note 3, at 459.
63. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 326.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 326-27.
67. United States v. Belmont, 85 F.2d 542, 543 (1936).
68. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331.
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This was not the first time that the Court ruled that states did not have a
voice in resisting the unwanted effects of the federal government's
foreign affairs decisions, and there is a line of cases dismissing state
concerns going back to the first half of the nineteenth century.69
One case in particular stands out. The Supreme Court decided
Missouri v. Holland7° in 1920. In Holland, Justice Holmes ruled that a
treaty regulating the hunting of migratory fowl, and the federal statute
implementing it, could not be struck down on the basis of federalism
concerns. 7 1  This ruling came despite lower court decisions citing
principles of federalism that had rejected a similar federal statute enacted
prior to the treaty.72 Holland has come to stand for the principle that the
federal government's treaty power, unlike other constitutional powers, is
not subject to federalism limits. 73
While this ruling gives the federal government enormous power in
regards to its treaties, Professor David M. Golove makes a lengthy and
convincing argument that this is exactly what the Framers intended.74 In
order to prevent the states' abuse of treaties that occurred under the
Articles of Confederation, the Framers had good cause to adopt a system
where treaties, once adopted, could not be undermined.75 Without state
advice and consent in deciding what treaties to adopt, however, the
Holland decision gives the federal government a broad treaty-making
power without regard for state concerns.
As indicated in the Introduction, the President and the Senate
attempted to strengthen the state role in the treaty process during the last
two decades by introducing federalism reservations to treaties and not
seeking enforcement of ICJ rulings.76 While these methods have put the
United States in tension with international law, that tension is the product
69. See, e.g., Ku, supra note 3, at 459 nn.2-3 (citing Zchemig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429, 441 (1968); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889); Holmes v.
Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575 (1840)).
70. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
71. Id. at 433-34 (specifically holding that the treaty did not violate some "invisible
radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment") (cited for the same
proposition in Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 415).
72. Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 415 (citing United States v.
McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 292-96 (D. Kan. 1915); United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154,
160 (E.D. Ark. 1914)).
73. See Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 423 (citing Holland as the basis
for arguments that the federal government's foreign affairs powers are not subject to any
constitutional limitations).
74. Golove, supra note 2, at 1102-49.
75. Id. at 1132. Golove particularly applauds the Court's opinion in Holland, stating
that it "ought rightly to be celebrated as among the greatest of the Court's decisions." Id.
at 1266.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 7-23.
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of political decisionmaking and not the result of the fundamental
structure of U.S. law. First, if the federal government were concerned
about the legality of the federalism reservations, it could simply
withdraw them. Second, while the Clinton administration insisted that it
could not force the states to comply with ICJ rulings,77 the federal
government has successfully sued states to force compliance in the
past.78 Thus, the federal government appears to maintain the final word
as to whether or not the United States meets its treaty obligations and has
merely made a political choice at times to favor state interests over
international obligations.79
The nature of U.S. incapacity to meet obligations could change,
however, if the Supreme Court applies certain substantive, procedural,
and remedial limits on the federal treaty power that appear to follow
from the Court's federalism jurisprudence in other areas. These limits
would formalize state power in the treaty process, while making
compliance with international obligations substantially more difficult.
80
In analyzing these limits, this article relies on a recent and
comprehensive article by Professor Edward T. Swaine.8'
The first of these limits involves a potential reassessment by the
Court of the broad holding in Missouri v. Holland.82 Swaine cites a series
of recent cases for the proposition that the Supreme Court might take a
77. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
78. Malvina Halberstam, The Constitutional Authority of the Federal Government in
State Criminal Proceedings that Involve U.S. Treaty Obligations or Affect U.S. Foreign
Relations, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 14 [hereinafter Halberstam, Constitutional
Authority] (citing Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925); United
States v. Arlington, 669 F.2d. 925 (4th Cir. 1982)). Ku argues that such suits have only
been brought to enforce treaties that were self-executing and thus don't apply to the ICJ
orders, which he argues are non-self executing. Ku, supra note 3, at 517-18. Ku states
that the only other times the federal government has sued to enforce treaty obligations
have been in cases involving American Indian treaties where the federal government was
considered a "guardian" of Indian interests. Id. at 491 n.174, 517 n.301 (citing United
States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926); United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676
(9th Cir. 1975)). The Bush administration apparently believes it has the authority to force
state compliance, having ordered state courts to review the cases of foreign nationals
denied consular notification rights. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Texas has
questioned the constitutionality of the administration's decision, Supreme Court to Hear,
supra note 28, and the issue will most likely be brought before a court before long.
79. See Halberstam, Constitutional Authority, supra note 78, at 5 ("Although the
practice in the United States is apparently for the Secretary of State to forward requests
regarding non-imposition of the death penalty to the state in which the accused is to be
tried, that is a matter of policy, not constitutional requirement."); cf Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to U.S. Foreign Relations, 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 675, 679 (1998) (arguing that whether or not federalism trumps
international affairs is a decision for the political branches to make).
80. Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 408.
81. Id.
82. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
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step back from Holland and apply some type of federalism limit to the
federal government's power to make and implement treaties.8 3 Professor
Curtis A. Bradley believes that this limit should in part take the form of
that found in United States v. Lopez, City of Boerne v. Flores, and United
States v. Morrison.8 4  In those cases, the Court struck down federal
legislation as exceeding the powers granted under the Commerce Clause
and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 85 reasoning that without
some limits the federal government would have an unchecked police
86 8power and interfere in areas of traditional state concern.87 The ruling inHolland explicitly rejects the application of federalism principles used to
83. Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 415-16 (citing Solid Waste Agency v.
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); .United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
84. Bradley summarizes his argument in Bradley, Treaty Power Part II, supra note
45, at 100-0 1 (arguing that the best rule for applying federalism limits to the treaty power
"would allow the treatymakers the ability to conclude treaties on any subject but would
limit their ability to create supreme federal law to the scope of Congress's power to do
so"); see Bradley, Treaty Power Part I, supra note 45, at 456 (explaining "the option I
favor, would be to subject the treaty power to the same federalism restrictions that apply
to Congress's legislative powers. Under this approach, the treaty power would not confer
any additional regulatory powers on the federal government, just the power to bind the
United States on the international plane. Thus, for example, it could not be used to
resurrect legislation determined by the Supreme Court to be beyond Congress's
legislative powers, such as the legislation at issue in the recent New York, Lopez,
Boerne, and Printz decisions"). Bradley incorporated Morrison into his argument in
Bradley, Treaty Power Part II, supra, at 115-17. For a brief description of Bradley's
position, see Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 418-19.
85. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (holding that the civil remedy provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act exceeded Congress's authority under the Fourteenth Amendment
and Commerce Clause); Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (holding that Congress did not have power
under the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act);
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause).
86. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 ("To uphold the Government's contentions here, we
would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the States."); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("'[I]f we were to
accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an
individual that Congress is without power to regulate."' (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at
564)).
87. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 ("'Were the federal government to take over the
regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern.., the boundaries between the
spheres of federal and state authority would blur ... ' (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577
(Kennedy, J., concurring))); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (characterizing RFRA as "a
considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general
authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens"). My characterization in
this and the preceding footnote of the reasoning in Lopez and Morrison is based on my
analysis of those cases in Cyril Robert Emery, Note, Setting Boundaries for
Extraterritorial Applications of the Property Clause: An Assessment of an Alternative
Source ofAuthority for Environmental Regulations, 79 IND. L. J. 515 (2004).
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limit Congress's authority in other areas to the treaty power,88 and
Bradley states that the case would, therefore, have to be overturned.89
Although Swaine suggests more subtle strategies the Court might use to
limit Holland,90 he agrees its reversal is a possibility.91 The reversal of
Holland would protect states by preventing U.S. enforcement of treaties
that circumvent traditional limits on federal power. For example, in
reference to Holland, the federal government could no longer rely on its
treaty power to enforce a migratory bird statute that Congress could not
implement with its commerce power.92 While Holland's reversal might
protect state interests, it would seriously interfere with U.S. ability to
meet treaty obligations. If federal legislation implementing older treaties
were struck down as violating federalism principles, the United States
would find itself without a means of enforcing those treaties and would,
therefore, be in violation of its obligations.
A potential procedural limit on the treaty power arises from the
Court's recent application of the anticommandeering principle. In New
York v. United States93 and Printz v. United States, 94 the Supreme Court
ruled that when legislating under the commerce power the federal
government may not direct state legislatures to adopt regulatory
programs or force state officials to actively enforce federal laws. If this
rule were applied to the treaty power, it could prevent implementation of
treaties such as the VCCR. The United States ratified the VCCR in
1969. The treaty is self-executing 95 and, thus, went into force as national
law immediately without the need for legislative implementation.96 The
88. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,432-33 (1920).
89. Bradley, Treaty Power Part II, supra note 45, at 100-01.
90. First, he submits that the Court might presume when examining treaties that the
federal government did not intend to exceed its general legislative history. Swaine, Does
Federalism, supra note 1, at 422. Second, he proposes that the Court might more closely
scrutinize whether certain provisions of implementing legislation are necessary to fulfill a
treaty's obligations. Id.
91. As Swaine recognizes, an essential part of the Holland decision is that the
decision's author, Justice Holmes, assumes that Congress has the power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to creating implementing legislation for any treaty the
federal government has ratified. Id. at 419 n.66. Swaine argues that the Supreme Court
has been much less indulgent of late in reading the Necessary and Proper Clause, opening
the door for that part of Holland to be overturned. Id. at 420-21.
92. Migratory bird legislation enacted before ratification of the Migratory Bird
Treaty had been found to exceed Congress's commerce power. United States v.
McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915) (cited in Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1,
at 415).
93. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
94. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
95. E.g., Standt v. City of New York, 153 F.Supp.2d 417, 423 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
96. Vdzquez, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 33, at 695 (stating that "[a]t a
general level, a self-executing treaty may be defined as a treaty that may be enforced in
the courts without prior legislation by Congress").
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VCCR, however, entails a certain measure of active implementation
because one of its provisions requires that officials notify arrested
foreign nationals of their right to communicate with their consulate.97 In
the Committee on Foreign Relations' report on the VCCR, members of
the Senate recognized that the states would need to fulfill some of the
treaty's obligations because state officers control many arrests.98 While
state enforcement of the VCCR has not been particularly effective,99 it
appears to be the only practical method of adopting the treaty. 00 If the
anticommandeering principle were applied to the VCCR, however, the
federal government could not ask state officers to fulfill the treaty's
obligations. 10' The federal government would be left with the
97. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36(1)(b), 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
98. Senators James William Fulbright and Philip Clifford Case implicitly recognized
the need for state implementation when they asked Deputy Legal Advisor J. Edward
Lyerly, "[h]ow does the State Department notify State and local jurisdictions of the
provisions of consular treaties so that they know which consuls (if any) to notify when
they arrest a foreign national?," S. Exec Rep. No. 91-9, app., at 24 (1969) (statement of
Deputy Legal Adviser J. Edward Lyerly) (cited by William J. Aceves, The Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 268 (1998), for a similar proposition).
99. For example, in 2004, the ICJ found that U.S. officials had failed to notify fifty-
one Mexicans of their consular rights upon arrest. Avena Final Order, supra note 17, at
611 106(1). While this may seem like a small number, the ICJ was only concerned
with inmates on death row. There are presumably many more non-death row inmates
who were not notified of consular rights.
100. Chad Thomberry, Federalism v. Foreign Affairs: How the United States Can
Administer Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Within the States,
31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 107, 125 (1999); see Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at
432 n. 115 (stating that, in regards to the VCCR, the United States "could have more
actively supervised state and local officials, or hired a third party to do so, but the size
and complexity of such an undertaking would be staggering").
101. Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L.
REv. 1317, 1323 (1999) [hereinafter Vizquez, The Treaty Power]. Although the
anticommandeering principle would have a negative impact on U.S. ability to meet treaty
obligations, its benefits for state interests are perhaps limited. While the principle would
prevent the federal government from burdening states with certain treaty obligations, it
could also prevent the federal government from seeking federalism reservations designed
to protect states. Federalism reservations protect states not only by potentially allowing
them to choose whether to implement treaties at all, see supra note 13 and accompanying
text, but also by giving them flexibility to implement treaties in a manner they see fit.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text. According to Professor Carlos Manuel
V6.zquez, if applied in the treaty context, the anticommandeering principle would render
federalism reservations unconstitutional because they leave legislative implementation of
treaties to states thus commandeering state legislatures. Vdzquez, The Treaty Power,
supra, at 1354-56. If this came to pass and the federal government still wished to
implement a treaty to which reservations were attached, it could enforce the treaty
directly using federal officials instead of state legislatures. This would harm states by
taking away their control over implementation of these treaties, leaving them at the mercy
of the federal government's enforcement techniques.
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impractical option of performing the notifications' °2 or the unattractive
choice of breaching the treaty and accepting the consequences.
10 3
Of the federalism limits on the treaty power that the Court could
potentially adopt, the application of the state sovereign immunity
doctrine as a remedial limit seems the most probable and imminent. In
two cases arising from the ICJ disputes mentioned above, the Supreme
Court stated in dicta that under the Eleventh Amendment foreign
governments probably cannot sue states for violations of a treaty.' 0 4 If
these dicta are followed, it will mean that foreign nations and nationals
cannot sue states to meet treaty obligations that have been assigned to
those states through federalism reservations or simply by default, as in
the case of the VCCR. 105 By not providing remedies to certain treaty
violations, the United States would potentially be in further breach of
these treaties and even more at odds with international law.1
06
If any of these judicial limits on the federal treaty power come to
pass, they would legally cement a preference for states' rights over
international obligations and make the federal government's compliance
with treaties very difficult. One would hope, however, that the Court, as
much as the federal government, would prefer a method of incorporating
federalism in the treaty process that neither undermines international
obligations nor too severely challenges the legal structure that has been
built to protect the states.
Academic responses to the current tension in the U.S. between
federalism and treaty obligations tend toward absolutism. For example,
if Professor Bradley's suggestion that Holland should be reversed were
accepted, states would exercise a vast new power in reviewing treaties
that would severely hamper the federal government's ability to meet
obligations and surely solidify the United States' reputation as an
international scofflaw. To avoid this, the U.S. federal government could
simply adopt a practice of not ratifying any treaties that implicate state
interests. This practice would prevent U.S. conflicts with international
law but would not meet the federal government's needs. For example,
102. See supra note 100.
103. Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 432. Those consequences would not
include being dragged into the ICJ now that the Bush administration has withdrawn the
United States from the optional protocol giving the ICJ jurisdiction over conflicts arising
under the VCCR. Liptak, supra note 26, at A16. International relations consequences
would, of course, remain.
104. Fed. Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 112 (1999); Breard v.
Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998); see also Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at
435 (citing these cases for the same principle).
105. Swaine Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 438.
106. Id. at 438-41 (explaining that application of state sovereign immunity could
threaten certain treaties that have provisions requiring remedies, such as the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights).
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the federal government has shown an interest in adopting human rights
treaties10 7 and, despite the federalism concerns raised by these treaties,
10 8
continues to consider signing and ratifying them.'09
On the opposite end of the spectrum from Bradley's suggestion are
assertions that the states have no place in foreign affairs.1"0 These
assertions, however, neither account for the Framers' intent nor the
commitment by the federal government to include states in the treaty
process. Outside of these absolutist arguments, scholars have suggested
giving states the ability to form their own international agreements as a
method of reconciling federalism and international obligations.
For example, Professor Swaine and others advance the revival of
state-foreign compacts. 1 ' Under the Constitution, the states may, with
the approval of Congress, form compacts with foreign nations
1 1 2
Compacts have rarely been used, but Swaine argues that if federal
authority to implement treaties or to require states to implement them is
lacking, the federal government could have states fill the gap by forming
international agreements covering the same subject matter.' 13  For
107. See Bradley, Treaty Power Part I, supra note 45, at 402-03 (identifying various
human rights treaties that have been adopted or considered by the federal government);
Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 414 (stating that "[a]s for
the desirability of ratifying human rights treaties, presidents and the Senate have agreed
that a failure by the United States to ratify the major human rights treaties would result
in ... foreign policy costs").
108. Human rights treaties tend to implicate traditional areas of state concern, such as
criminal and family law. Spiro, supra note 24, at 568; see also Jack L. Goldsmith,
Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REv. 1617, 1674-75 (1997)
(stating that human rights treaties "have numerous potential conflicts with state law").
109. For example, the current Bush administration initially supported ratification of
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
although the administration has now withdrawn that support. Natasha Fain, Human
Rights Within the United States: The Erosion of Confidence, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
607, 614-15 (making the point that the Bush administration has generally taken no
positive action on human rights treaties under consideration). For other evidence of
federal interest in human rights treaties, see Ku, supra note 3, at 463 (citing the examples
from Bradley, Treaty Power Part I, supra note 45, at 402-03, mentioned supra in note
103).
110. See Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 3, at 1129 n.1 (citing, but not
agreeing with, e.g. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 150; LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §4-6, at 230 (2d ed. 1988)).
111. Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 494; see Anderson, supra note 49, at
245-47.
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress .... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power .. "). Historically, Congress has been granted broad leeway in determining the
method of its consent. See Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 501-02 (citing
evidence for Congress's ability to consent in the manner of its own choosing).
113. Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 510. The requirement of
congressional approval would prevent states from entering agreements that would
undermine the federal government's foreign affairs goals. See id. at 503-05 (explaining
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example, if the Court finds that the anticommandeering principle
invalidates the VCCR, Swaine suggests that the states could, with
Congress's permission, intervene and negotiate with foreign nations to
form compacts granting consular notification rights. 1
4
While theoretically sound, state agreements with foreign nations
present grave practical difficulties. These difficulties arise due to the
nature of the agreements that states would most likely be called upon to
make. Considering the federal government's federalism worries
regarding human rights agreements,1 15 such agreements would seem
especially suitable for state-foreign compacts. Human rights compacts,
though, would likely prove impractical because they purport to guarantee
individual rights. 116 Consider Swaine's example of the VCCR. Just as
human rights treaties guarantee individual rights, the VCCR entitles
individuals to be notified of their right to communicate with their
consulate." 7  If the VCCR were struck down and states entered into
compacts, they could certainly provide foreign arrestees with consular
notification. The foreign nations that agreed to the compact, however,
would have no way of providing reciprocity for this or any other compact
guaranteeing individual rights because it is extremely difficult to
satisfactorily identify the state citizenship of U.S. citizens. 18 Passports
the various ways Congress can control state-foreign compacts).
114. Id. at 522-23.
115. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, World War II Compensation and Foreign Relations
Federalism, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 282, 287 (2002) (stating that "when ratifying human
rights treaties, the President and Senate routinely attach federalism understandings
providing that the treaties will be implemented in a manner consistent with our federal
system of government").
116. For context, consider the following:
Until recently, international law has exclusively focused on states. Individuals
did not have rights under international law. In the last fifty years, a large
number of states have ratified treaties that deal with individual human rights,
such as the Genocide Convention, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the Convention on Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. All of these
protect individual human rights.
Malvina Halberstam, The Application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to an
Action Against the French Railroad for Transporting Thousands of Jews and Others to
Their Deaths: Abrams v. SNCF, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
117. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36(1)(b), 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261; see also LaGrand Final Order, supra note 17, at 1102
128(4) (holding that by not notifying Karl and Walter LaGrand of their rights under the
VCCR, the United States violated its obligation to the brothers).
118. The Fourteenth Amendment states, "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. This would imply that
individuals are citizens of the states wherein they reside. The Supreme Court, however,
resisted this definition of state citizenship in the area where the issue comes up most:
determining state citizenship for the purpose of establishing diversity jurisdiction. 13B
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are not state-specific and the most common legal test concerning state
citizenship rests on the intent of the person in question. 19 Without some
type of reform, therefore, foreign nations would be unable to identify
whether a U.S. citizen came from the state party to the compact or a state
that did not grant consular notification rights. At best, the foreign nation
could only provide uncertain implementation of the agreement that
would occasionally deny benefits to deserving arrestees.
This is not an insurmountable problem, but it does present a
significant practical barrier because the entire structure of U.S. state
citizenship would have to be revised in order for states to create effective
agreements with foreign nations. The United States could adopt state-
specific passports and more rigid legal definitions of state citizenship. In
the face of such extreme measures, however, the question arises whether
there is a more practical method of reconciling state interests and
international obligations.
II. State Involvement in the Australian Treaty-Making Process
Like the United States, Australia has adopted recent reforms to give
states a greater role in the treaty process. While the two nations have
similar constitutional frameworks, the Australian reforms have focused
on state advice as opposed to federalism reservations or declarations of
federal incapacity. In this section, this article provides a comparison of
the two systems, relying on an article by Brian R. Opeskin and Donald R.
Rothwell.120  This article then examines the recent Australian reforms
and evaluates their efficacy.
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3611 (3rd ed. 1998 &
Supp. 2004) (citing Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646 (1878)). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(2000), the federal district courts have jurisdiction over actions between citizens of
different states dealing with claims over a certain minimum amount. Rather than strictly
define state citizenship, courts have decided that for "diversity purposes, state citizenship
is essentially synonymous with domicile." Peter B. Oh, A Jurisdictional Approach to
Collapsing Corporate Distinctions, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 389, 455 (2003). Courts
generically hold that "domicile of a person is the place where he has his true, fixed home
and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of
returning." Wright, supra, at § 3612. Predictably, considering the requirement of
looking at intent, this test has been criticized as being too difficult to apply. David P.
Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 10
(1968) (stating that "[d]omicile is an unsatisfactory test for American state citizenship...
because it is difficult to determine"); see also Wright, supra, at § 3612 (cataloging some
of the difficulties courts face determining intent). Considering the mountain of judicial
decisions addressing the issue, see Wright, supra, at § 3612, it would seem that courts
struggle to apply the domicile rule, and foreign officials could hardly be expected to do
any better.
119. See supra note 118 (explaining the role of intent in determining state
citizenship).
120. Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37.
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Just as in the United States, the drafters of the Australian
Constitution provided for federal authority in foreign affairs. Whereas
the Framers of the U.S. Constitution were explicit in giving
predominance to the federal government in treaty matters, 121 the
Australian Framers had cause to be more circumspect. When the
Australian Constitution became effective in 1901, Australia's foreign
relations were still controlled by the Imperial government, and the
Constitution's drafters were wary about including provisions explicitly
relating to the power to make treaties. 122 Nonetheless, Sections 51 and
61 of the Constitution have come to stand for the proposition that the
federal government has the final word in treaty matters.
Section 61 of the Constitution states, "The executive power of the
Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the
Governor-General as the Queen's representative, and extends to the
execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the
Commonwealth."'' 23  As Opeskin and Rothwell explain, this archaic
clause gives the current Australian executive branch, as embodied by the
Prime Minister and his or her cabinet, the foreign affairs powers that
were previously held by the Queen, including the authority to make and
terminate treaties. 124  This provision, although vastly more opaque,
mirrors Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution. 125 Thus,
just like the U.S. President, the Australian Prime Minister makes treaties.
The Constitutions differ, however, in that the Australian Prime Minister
can ratify treaties without the legislative branch's consent.
126
The Australian Federal Legislature, like the U.S. Congress, is an
organ of enumerated powers and is delegated power over "external
affairs" under Section 51 of the Constitution. 127 The Australian High
Court has interpreted this power to include the ability to implement
basically any treaty signed and ratified by the Prime Minister. 128 This
121. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
122. Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 429-30.
123. AUSTL. CONST. ch. 2, § 61.
124. Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 4-5.
125. Giving the President the power to enter into treaties with advice and consent of
the Senate.
126. Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 5.
127. "The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for
the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to: ...
External Affairs ...." AuSTL. CONST. ch. 1, pt. 5, § 51, cl. 29.
128. "The upshot of the High Court's interpretation of federal legislative power over
external affairs is that Parliament does not lack power to implement treaties to which
Australia is or intends to become a party, whatever their subject matter." Opeskin &
Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 12. Opeskin & Rothwell come to this
conclusion based on High Court decisions in Queensland v. Commonwealth (1989) 167
C.L.R. 232; Richardson v. Forestry Comm'n (1988) 164 C.L.R. 261; Commonwealth v.
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essentially gives the Australian Federal Legislature the same broad
power to implement treaties granted to the U.S. Congress in Missouri v.
Holland. Unlike the default rule of self-execution in the United States,
treaties are non-self-executing in Australia and, therefore, require
legislative implementation to become binding domestically. 129 To avoid
the international embarrassment of ratifying a treaty that the Federal
Legislature won't implement, the Prime Minister generally assures that
legislation will be passed prior to ratification. 130
The states can also implement treaties and in some cases are better
situated to do so. 131 For this reason, the Australian Federal Legislature
sometimes leaves the responsibility to them, just as the U.S. federal
government leaves treaty implementation to the U.S. states on
occasion. 132 Nevertheless, under the Australian Constitution, if a state
fails to implement a treaty, the Federal Legislature can always choose to
enact pre-empting legislation. 133 Neither U.S. nor Australian states can
independently form treaties with foreign nations. 
134
Thus, just like the U.S. federal government since adoption of the
Seventeenth Amendment, the Australian federal government historically
possessed sole authority to negotiate and ratify treaties and the power to
implement them. While this model provided the federal government
with the tools to meet its treaty obligations, it did little to protect states'
interests. In 1975, two treaties that impinged on traditional areas of state
concern regarding the environment and human rights entered into force
in Australia: the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage (hereinafter the World Heritage Convention) 3 5 and the
Tasmania (1983) 158 C.L.R. 1; Koonwarta v. Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 C.L.R. 168.
Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 11.
129. Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 6-8.
130. Id. at 6.
131. Id. at 15-17.
132. Ku, supra note 3, at 477-526 (cataloging a variety of areas in which states have
implemented treaties through legislation or otherwise); see also supra note 100 and
accompanying text (explaining that it makes practical sense that the states implement
some of the VCCR obligations).
133. Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 16 n.69 (citing
AUSTL. CONST. ch. 5, § 109).
134. As for Australia, consider Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note
37, at 13 (citing New South Wales v. Commonwealth (the Seas and Submerged Lands
Case) (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337; Commonwealth v. New South Wales (1923) 32 C.L.R.
200; for principle that Australian states have no legal personality and cannot enter into
treaties). In the United States, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 prohibits states from entering
into treaties.
135. Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
entered into force Nov. 17, 1975, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1975 Austl. T.S. No. 47. Like Opeskin &
Rothwell, this article uses the Australian Treaty Series citations for Australian treaties.
These citations indicate the year when the treaty entered force in Australia.
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International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. 136 The states challenged federal implementation of these
treaties as exceeding federal authority under Section 51 of the
Constitution, but the High Court repeatedly ruled against them.' 37 It held
that, as long as the obligation was bona fide and not an overt attempt to
enhance the power of the Federal Parliament, the implementing
legislation was valid. 138  While the bona fide requirement hints at a
potential limitation on the Federal Parliament's power to implement
treaties, the Australian High Court has yet to strike down treaty
legislation as exceeding federal authority.
Although the High Court has not offered the states legal protection
from the implementation of treaties affecting their traditional areas of
concern, procedural changes in treaty making have made up for it, at
least in part. These changes began in 1976 with the election of a
conservative government that was dedicated to a policy of "cooperative
federalism."'' 39  This policy manifested itself in various attempts to
include states in the treaty process. For example, in 1977, proposals
were made to give states an advisory role in the negotiation and
ratification of treaties. 140 During that same year, the Australian federal
government published Guidelines on Treaty Consultation stating that the
government would pursue federalism reservations where appropriate.
41
While the use of federalism reservations was quickly abandoned, 42 state
136. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 1975 Austl. T.S. No.
40. Opeskin & Rothwell cite this treaty and others as covering "subject areas that were
traditionally regarded as falling within state competence, namely human rights and the
environment." Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 10-11.
137. Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 11-12 (citing
Queensland v. Commonwealth 167 C.L.R. 232 (Austl.1989); Richardson v. Forestry
Comm'n 164 C.L.R. 261 (Austl. 1988); Commonwealth v. Tasmania 158 C.L.R. 1
(Austl. 1983); Koonwarta v. Bjelke-Petersen 153 C.L.R. 168 (Austl. 1982)).
138. For example, in Richardson v. Forestry Commission 164 C.L.R. 261 (Austl.
1988), Justice Gaudron summarizes the High Court's position as follows:
The fact that Australia is a party to a treaty (leaving to one side a treaty which
is not entered into bona fide) will itself suffice to engage the power to legislate
with respect to external affairs, and will authorize the passing of a law so long
as that law is reasonably capable of being viewed as conducive to the purpose
of the treaty if it is also reasonably capable of being viewed as appropriate, or
adapted to, the circumstance which engages the power.
Id. at 343 (Gaudron, J.); see Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at
12.
139. Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 18-19.
140. Trick or Treaty?, supra note 40, at 13.19; Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of
Treaties, supra note 37, at 14.
141. Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 18-19 (citing Henry
Burmester, Federal Clauses: An Australian Perspective, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 522, 534
(1985)).
142. In 1983, the newly elected labour government rejected the use of federalism
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advice in treaty making is the hallmark of Australia's current "Principles
and Procedures for Commonwealth-State Consultation on Treaties"
(hereinafter "Principles and Procedures") agreed to by the state
Premiers 143 and the federal government as part of broad Australian treaty
reforms in 1996.144
The basic mechanism for state advice under the "Principles and
Procedures" is the Commonwealth-State Standing Committee on
Treaties (hereinafter State Standing Committee). 145 The State Standing
Committee is a body of federal officials and senior officers from the
various states that meets at least twice a year. 146 Every six months, the
federal government is required to provide the states with a list of current
and upcoming treaty negotiations. 47  The State Standing Committee
examines this list and identifies treaties of importance to the states and
proposes mechanisms for involving the states in the negotiation of those
treaties. 148  It also coordinates state representation on relevant treaty
delegations. 49 Finally, it reports on the implementation of treaties that
have implications for the states. 15
0
The "Principles and Procedures" incorporate other significant
reservations in the "Principles and Procedures for Commonwealth-State Consultation on
Treaties" (hereinafter "Principles and Procedures") agreed to by the state Premiers and
the Commonwealth government. Trick or Treaty?, supra note 40, at 13.8. According
to the "Principles and Procedures," the international community viewed the reservations
with contempt and as simply a method of evading international obligations. Id. This has
been the official Australian position ever since. Principles and Procedures, supra note
16,a t 8.1 (stating Australian position regarding federalism reservations in the current
version of the "Principles and Procedures"); see also Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of
Treaties, supra note 37, at 18-19 (making same claim in 1995 and citing 1992 "Principles
and Procedures" as evidence).
143. Premiers are the Australian equivalent of U.S. state Governors.
144. Principles and Procedures, supra note 16. There have been several incarnations
of the "Principles and Procedures," this is only the most recent. Trick or Treaty?, supra
note 40, at 13.8, 13.19. For a basic review of the 1996 treaty reforms, see
Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 439-44.
145. Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, at 5.4-5.5; Trick or Treaty?, supra
note 40, at 13.22.
146. Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, at 5.4; Trick or Treaty?, supra note
40, 13.22. The State Standing Committee "consists of representatives from the
Premier's or Chief Minister's Departments in every State and Territory. [The State
Standing Committee] is chaired by a senior official of the Prime Minister's Department
and also has representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the
Attorney General's Department." Australian Government, Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade Web site, http://www.dfat.gov.au/treaties/making/making2.html (last
visited June 20, 2005).
147. Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, at 4.2(b); Trick or Treaty?, supra
note 40, at 13.23.
148. Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, at 5.4; Trick or Treaty?, supra note
40, at 13.22.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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mechanisms for state advice as well. In 1996 the Australian Senate
adopted a resolution requiring the preparation of a National Interest
Analysis (hereinafter NIA) for every treaty tabled in Parliament. 5' NIAs
are the procedural equivalent of Environmental Impact Statements in the
United States. 152  Essentially, they are publicly available documents
created by the federal government detailing the benefits and drawbacks
of adopting a treaty under consideration. 153  The "Principles and
Procedures" require the federal government to consult with the states
during the preparation of NIAs for treaties that implicate state
interests. 
54
As part of the 1996 reforms, the Australian federal government also
established a Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (hereinafter
JSCOT).155 JSCOT releases reports on matters arising from treaties and
NIAs. 156  Although JSCOT is made up of members of the Federal
Parliament who, like U.S. Senators, do not represent state interests, it has
made a habit of reviewing and commenting on the federal government's
consultations with states during the treaty process. 5 7  JSCOT's close
scrutiny of the consultations gives the states an additional layer of
procedural protection, and its publicly available reports, in combination
151. Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 439-40 (citing Minister for Foreign Affairs and
the Attorney-General, Government Announces Reform of Treaty-Making, Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Media Release FA 29 (May 2, 1996) [hereinafter Reform of
Treaty-Making], available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/releases/foreign/1996/
fa29.html). Under the reforms every treaty signed by Australia must be tabled in
Parliament at least fifteen days before it can be ratified. Id.
152. For more on EISs, see infra note 190 and accompanying text.
153. Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 439-40; Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing
Committee on Treaties Web Site [hereinafter JSCOT Web Site], http://www.aph.gov.au/
house/committee/jsct/ppgrole.htm (last visited June 20, 2005).
154. Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, at 4.2(c).
155. JSCOT Web Site, supra note 153; see Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 439-40
(citing Reform of Treaty-Making, supra note 151).
156. JSCOT Web Site, supra note 153; see Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 441.
157. For the most in-depth review, see Joint Standing Committee on Treaties,
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report 61: The Australia-United States
Free Trade Agreement at 9 3.43-3.63 (June 2004) [hereinafter Report 611 (reviewing
consultations between states and Commonwealth during negotiations leading up to the
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement), http://www.aph.gov.au/house/
committee/jsct/usafta/report.htm. See also Joint Standing Committee on Treaties,
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report 60: Treaties Tabled on 2 March
2004 at 3.21-3.23 (May 2004) (briefly reviewing state consultations on the World
Tourism Organization), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/
committee/jsct/usafta/report.htm; Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of
the Commonwealth of Australia, Report 62: Treaties Tabled on 30 March 2004 at
2.50-2.53 (Aug. 2004) (briefly reviewing state consultations on the Agreement between
the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand for the Establishment
of a Joint Scheme for the regulation of Therapeutic Products), available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct/usafta/report.htm.
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with the NIAs, make information about treaty making more readily
available to the general population. 1
58
Finally, the "Principles and Procedures" establish a Treaties
Council. 59 The Treaties Council is made up of the Australian Prime
Minister and the Premiers of each state and provides an opportunity for
the states to suggest federal adoption of treaties and discuss treaties
referred to it by the State Standing Committee.' 60 The Treaties Council
is required to meet every year but, in fact, has met just once since its
establishment.' 61 This lapse may appear to tarnish the reforms, but a
recent article suggests that it possibly reflects the success of the State
Standing Committee, which has simply not felt the need to refer treaties
to the Treaties Council.
62
Despite criticism that the Treaties Council has not met frequently
enough,163 state involvement through the NIAs and the State Standing
Committee has received positive reviews from the states. For example,
in JSCOT's 1999 report on the treaty process, New South Wales
Legislative Council member Hon. Ronald Dyer stated that the State
Standing Committee "mechanism at a bureaucratic level appears to be
working well. The officials are meeting regularly, and that is
excellent.' ' 164  The representative from Tasmania, a state that has
particularly suffered from the effects of treaties, 165 was not as positive,
158. Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 440-41.
159. Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, at 5.1-5.3.
160. Id. at 5.1-5.4. In the context of the United States, imagine the President
formally meeting with the Governors of every state and discussing treaties.
161. Report 61, supra note 157,at 3.61.
162. Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 440-41.
163. See Report 61, supra note 157, at 3.61 (presenting Western Australian and
Australian Capital Territory submissions suggesting that the Treaties Council should
meet more often); Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia, Report 24: A Seminar on the Role of Parliaments in Treaty
Making, Appendix C-Seminar Transcript 47 (Aug. 1999) [hereinafter Report 24]
(statement of Hon. Ronald Dyer, member of New South Wales Legislative Council and
Chair of the Standing Committee on Law and Justice) (also suggesting the Treaties
Council should meet more often), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/
committee/jsct/reports/report24/report24.pdf (last visited June 20, 2005).
164. Report 24, supra note 163, Appendix C-Seminar Transcript 47 (statement of
Hon. Ronald Dyer, member of New South Wales Legislative Council and Chair of the
Standing Committee on Law and Justice). As mentioned in the previous note, Mr. Dyer
also suggested that the Treaties Council should meet more often. Id.
165. Tasmania has had laws and projects struck down because of interpretation of
treaties. First, in 1983, the High Court determined that Australia's membership in the
World Heritage Convention prohibited Tasmania from building a potentially lucrative
dam. Commonwealth v. Tasmania 158 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1983); Report 24, supra note
163, Appendix C-Seminar Transcript 47-48 (statement of Hon. Ray Bailey, President of
the Tasmanian Legislative Council). More recently, the federal government passed a law
preempting Tasmania's anti-sodomy laws in order to come into compliance with the
ICCPR. See Report 24, supra, Appendix C-Seminar Transcript 48 (statement of Hon.
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but nevertheless did "congratulate the federal government for having
introduced the measures."'
166
More recently, JSCOT released a report on the Australia-United
States Free Trade Agreement that reviewed state participation during the
negotiations. 167 The Agreement is of general significance to the states,
but especially relevant are government procurement provisions that
require the states to adhere to certain procedures when considering bids
for government contracts. 168 While the states were disappointed by the
level of consultation at the end of and after the negotiation process, 169 the
NIA indicated that the states were active in framing negotiation
objectives170  and were included as observers during the actual
negotiations. 17  Furthermore, JSCOT found that most states were
generally pleased with the amount of consultation and had praised the
federal government's efforts "to be more inclusive than during previous
negotiations."'' 72  The process of state advice in Australia seems,
therefore, to be a work in progress but on the way to fulfilling state
concerns regarding treaties.
The Australian model of state advice is not a panacea in terms of
balancing states' interests and international obligations. First, the
Australian reforms are merely procedural, and the federal government
can always ignore state advice 7 3 or, in an emergency, ratify a treaty
without it.174 As Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Hon. Alexander
Ray Bailey, President of the Tasmanian Legislative Council); Charlesworth, supra note
40, at 436.
166. Report 24, supra note 163, Appendix C-Seminar Transcript 47-48 (statement of
Hon. Ray Bailey, President of the Tasmanian Legislative Council).
167. Report 61, supra note 157, at 3.41-3.63.
168. Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, U.S.-Austl., ch.
15, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us_fta/final-text/index.html
[hereinafter AUSFTA]; Report 61, supra note 157, at 3.44.
169. Report 61, supra note 157, at 3.53, 3.55-3.60.
170. National Interest Analysis, Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement,
[2004] ATNIA 5, annex 1 [hereinafter ATNIA], http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/
dfat/nia/2004/5/annexl.html; see Report 61, supra note 157, at 3.48.
171. ATNIA, supra note 170, annex 1; Report 61, supra note 157, at 3.54. But see
Report 61, supra, at 3.55 (citing some state complaints about involvement in
negotiations).
172. Report 61, supra note 157, 3.53.
173. The People 's Process, supra note 42, at 7 (statement of Hon. Alexander Downer,
Minister of Foreign Affairs); see also Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia
and International Treaty Making Information Kit, Review of the Treaty-Making Process
6.6 (explaining why Australian states don't have a formal role in treaty making)
[hereinafter Treaty Making Information Kit], http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/
dfat/infokit.html.
174. Consider Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer's statement
in The People's Process, supra note 42, at 5, explaining that in an emergency the federal
government could sign and ratify a treaty without it being tabled in Parliament for the
requisite fifteen days. In such a situation, there would be no time for states to be
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Downer said in 2000, however, "we would obviously try to get a
consensus amongst the states and territories before ratifying a treaty
which is of relevance to them." 175 Second, the states can also undermine
the goals of the system by delaying or enacting faulty legislation when
asked to implement a treaty. 176 Despite these concerns, however, the
Australian model is functioning and has created a balance between state
interests and international obligations that sacrifices neither.
III. A Proposal for U.S. Adoption of Australian Treaty Reforms
Although successful in Australia, would state advice be an
appropriate remedy for the dilemma facing the United States over the
proper place of federalism in treaty making? U.S. adoption of state
advice certainly has historic charm, as the Framers' intended the
President to consult with the states before signing treaties.
77
Washington's quick dismissal of the practice and the Seventeenth
Amendment's final exclusion of states from any role in the treaty
process, however, tend to undermine the strength of an originalist
argument for adopting the Australian reforms. But that should not prove
fatal to an argument in favor of adoption. Australia adopted the reforms
without reference to historic precedent. More significantly, in 1994, the
U.S. federal government enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
(hereinafter URAA), which implements the international agreement of
the same name. 178 The Uruguay Round Agreements establish many of
the provisions that together form the World Trade Organization. The
URAA requires the U.S. Trade Representative to consider state advice
when formulating U.S. positions that affect state concerns on trade issues
arising from the Uruguay Round Agreements. 179  The federal
government's adoption of an act entailing state consultation in certain
circumstances shows that it is neither unwilling nor unable to pursue
state advice on matters of importance to the states. Furthermore,
adoption of a JSCOT-like joint standing committee to review and report
on treaties would be in line with congressional practice establishing
numerous committees and sub-committees to oversee everything from
agriculture to veterans' affairs. 1
80
consulted.
175. Id. at7.
176. Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 20.
177. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
178. Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624 (2000).
179. 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (b)(1)(B) (the URAA is also cited by Swaine, Does
Federalism, supra note 1, at 421 n.7 1, for this principle).
180. Consider the U.S. Senate Web site, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/
committees/dthreesectionswith teasers/committees_home.htm (last visited June 20,
2005).
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A. Benefits and Drawbacks of the Australian Reforms for the U.S.
States
Regardless of precedent, U.S. adoption of the Australian reforms
would have significant concrete benefits for the states and the federal
government. As far as the states are concerned, the greatest benefit
would be the opportunity to access and consult on any treaty of
importance to the states. 
181
This opportunity would, in some ways, provide the states broader
protection than the implementation of Swaine's state-foreign
compacts; 182 the federal government's continued use of federalism
reservations; or the reversal of Holland, Professor Bradley's extreme
proposal for reform.'83 These schemes are all deficient because they only
provide states with protection in limited circumstances. State-foreign
compacts must be authorized by Congress, and thus can only be adopted
on the federal government's whim. 184 Similarly, federalism reservations
are applied only when the federal government identifies a treaty as
potentially interfering with state sovereignty. 185  Finally, while the
reversal of Holland could prevent the adoption of treaties for which there
is no other federal authority,' 86 it would not affect the adoption of
numerous other treaties that have serious implications for the states.
Consider, for example, treaties regulating trade. There is little question
181. See supra notes 140-54 and accompanying text for a description of how state
advice works in Australia.
182. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
184. Consider Swaine's explanation of the broad power Congress exercises over
compacts:
Under existing case law and contemporary practice, the "treaties" proscribed to
the states by the Compact Clause effectively comprise those pacts to which
Congress has not consented, and "compacts" are anything to which [Congress]
has consented.
Congress's power of consent, indeed, permits it far more authority than a veto,
and includes the power to condition consent. Congress has employed that
power to insist on federal participation in compact negotiations, to delegate to
the executive branch the authority so that it may approve the compact and
terminate it, to require federal participation in the administration of the
compact, and to require the return to Congress to approve additional parties.
Indeed, it would appear that Congress is permitted to stipulate in advance all
the compact's significant terms, a principle vindicated by the lower courts in a
case involving Landis and Frankfurter's favorite subject.
Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 503-05 (emphasis in original) (footnotes
omitted).
185. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 415-16
(discussing how the 'executive branch and the Senate design and attach federalism
reservations to treaties).
186. See Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 419 (explaining that such cases
would be rare under current the subject-matter federalism limitations on Congress).
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that the federal government can adopt treaties relating to commercial and
trade matters under its Commerce Clause power and would continue to
be able to do so if Holland were overturned. 187  Professor Bradley's
suggestion, therefore, offers no protection in regards to these treaties
even though they frequently have effects on traditional areas of state
concern. 188 Under the Australian reforms, on the other hand, states could
identify and consult on any treaty that they determine to affect their
interests, including trade agreements.
This is not to say that adopting the Australian reforms would
unequivocally favor the states. From a states' rights perspective, the
fundamental disadvantage to U.S. adoption of the Australian state advice
system is that it would offer states no concrete legal protections. Using
the Australian model, state advice and NIAs would be purely non-
binding procedures, and the federal government could ignore them at
will and continue to adopt treaties that interfere with traditional areas of
state concern. 189  A fear of unimpeded federal action, however,
underestimates the effectiveness of procedural protections in U.S. law.
Consider, for example, the National Environmental Policy Act
(hereinafter NEPA), which requires federal agencies to produce non-
binding Environmental Impact Statements (hereinafter EISs) before
taking action that might affect the environment. 190 The Act is widely
emulated and praised for its effectiveness in alerting agency managers of
environmental concerns that might otherwise have been ignored.' 91 At
best, it "opens governmental decisions to an unprecedented level of
187. Id. at 419 n.63.
188. See, e.g., John Kincaid, Fifty Years of German Basic Law: The New Departure
for Germany: The Domestication of German Foreign Policy in the European Union, 53
SMU L. REV. 555, 560 (2000) (explaining that free-trade agreements pose a particular
threat to the constitutional powers of constituent governments in federal systems because
these governments exercise most of the powers that create non-tariff trade barriers that
the agreements seek to ban). The U.S. federal government has taken non-judicial
measures to protect states in regards to free-trade agreements. Consider, for example, the
federal-state consultation measures mandated under the URAA. 19 U.S.C.
§ 3512(b)(1)(B).
189. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
190. Bradley C. Karkainnen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 904 (2002) (citing
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994)).
NEPA requires, among other things, that EISs include statements on the impact of a
proposed action, adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided if the action is
undertaken, alternatives to the action, and irreversible uses of resources predicated by the
action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i-v).
191. Karkainnen, supra note 190, at 904-06 (presenting, but not agreeing with, praise
of NEPA). NEPA has been criticized as too costly and burdensome, but the appeal of its
procedural nature has convinced even critics to propose alternative procedural measures
to replace it. See id. at 905-06 (rejecting NEPA but proposing an alternative "as
thoroughly procedural in character").
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public scrutiny,"'9 2 and thus "creates powerful pressures on agency
decisionmakers to avoid the most environmentally damaging courses of
action."
1 93
Similarly, if state concerns regarding a specific treaty were
presented to the President or Senate through consultation or a NIA, there
would be considerable pressure on the federal government not to ignore
those concerns without significant countervailing federal interests. There
is evidence that this is the case in Australia, where the Minister of
Foreign Affairs has said that the federal government has a strong
preference for getting state approval before ratifying a treaty. 1
94
B. Benefits and Drawbacks of the Australian Reforms for the U.S.
Federal Government
Adoption of the Australian model would not only benefit state
interests but would also, through the publicly available NIAs and JSCOT
reports, serve the public interest by bringing a degree of transparency to
a process that in the United States is renowned for being secretive and
autocratic.19  Furthermore, a paper trail could also serve the federal
government's interest in meeting treaty obligations.
Consider a 1997 assertion by then Governor George W. Bush's
general counsel Alberto R. Gonzalez that Texas was not responsible for
assuring compliance with the VCCR, because it had not signed the
treaty. 196 The Clinton administration appeared sensitive to this sort of
192. Id. at 904-05 (attributing this characterization to NEPA's supporters and citing,
e.g., Jonathon Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National Environmental
Policy Act's Process for Citizen Participation, 26 ENVTL. L. 53, 54-55 (1996)).
193. Id. at 905 (attributing this characterization to NEPA's supporters).
194. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
195. According to Professor Lori Fisler Damrosch, "[t]he president-centered model
has been dominant since the days of President Washington, but in the more complex,
globalized world of the twenty-first century, the treaty process should not be a closed,
secretive preserve, as if the president were an eighteenth-century monarch with the
Senate his coterie of courtiers." Lori Fisler Damrosch, Treaties and International
Regulation, 98 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 349, 350 (2004). Damrosch notes that some
progress has been made, especially in regards to trade agreements. Id.
196. Al Kamen, Virtually Blushing, WASH. POST, June 23, 1997 at A17 (quoting
general counsel Alberto R. Gonzalez) (cited by Spiro, supra note 24, at 588, for the
proposition that sub-national governments fail to consider international law in
decisionmaking). This statement foreshadowed an announcement by a spokesman for
current Texas Governor Rick Perry that the ICJ had no jurisdiction over Texas, and Texas
would not abide by its rulings in VCCR cases staying executions. The Nation Texas to
Ignore Court Order to Stay Executions, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at A33 (quoting Gene
Acuna, spokesman for Governor Rick Perry) (cited by Ku, supra note 3, at 512 n.280, for
similar proposition). This announcement came after the ICJ's February 5, 2003, Avena
Provisional Measures Order but before the March 31, 2004 final orders in that case.
Avena Final Order, supra note 17. A spokesman for the Texas attorney general,
however, made it clear immediately following the final order, that "[w]e have held
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rhetoric when it decided not to force state compliance with the ICJ orders
staying executions.' 97 If, however, under an Australian advice model,
Texas and other states had expressed satisfaction with the signing of the
VCCR in 1969,198 the record would have undermined Bush's
pronouncement, and the federal government could more comfortably
dismiss the political pressure against taking steps to enforce the ICJ
rulings. On the other hand, if the states had vigorously objected to the
treaty, President Nixon would have had strong incentive not to sign it.
There would remain, of course, situations in which the federal
government would want to adopt a treaty over state opposition. The
Australian reforms would not completely remedy the unpopularity of
such a move but might give it a degree of political legitimacy because, at
the very least, the states would have received procedural protection. The
Australian reforms also make allowances for keeping sensitive treaty
talks confidential, 9 9 and would, therefore, not undermine the federal
government's ability to negotiate such treaties. Consequently, U.S.
adoption of the reforms would not significantly impede the federal
government's ability to conduct foreign affairs and would provide it
necessary political legitimacy to enforce its international obligations.
This combination would ease the current tension between state concerns
steadfast prior to the ruling that it has no bearing on Texas.... We have contacted the
State Department to get their guidance.... But we still hold to our previous position."
Chris Kraul, U.S. Told to Review Death-penalty Cases Mexico Hails U.N. Court Decision
that 51 Inmates Were Denied Diplomatic Help, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 1, 2004, at A6,
available at 2004 WLNR 1778240. Texas maintained its resolved in the face of
President Bush's decision to order state courts to comply with the ICJ's review order.
Adam Liptak, supra note 26, at A16 (citing a statement by a spokesperson for the Texas
Attorney General that "[t]he State of Texas believes no international court supercedes the
laws of Texas or the laws of the United States").
197. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
198. Although the states have resisted the VCCR recently, it offers substantial
benefits to their citizens abroad, which might have induced them to support its
ratification. Consider, for example, Virginia Governor Jim Gilmore's recognition of the
importance or protecting citizens abroad in his statement explaining why he couldn't stay
the execution of Angel Francisco Breard. Charney & Reisman, supra note 22, at 674
(quoting Gilmore as saying that the Secretary of State's concerns for citizens abroad "are
due great respect and I have given them serious consideration").
199. First, even though the Australian federal government must keep the states abreast
of treaty negotiations of relevance to them, it can require that information concerning the
negotiations be kept confidential. Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, at 4.2(d).
Furthermore, the reforms do not require the publication of NIAs until treaties have been
signed, id. at 4.2(c) (explaining that NIAs are published when a treaty is tabled in
Parliament, which occurs after the treaty is signed, Reform of Treaty-Making, supra note
151), thus keeping the interest analysis private until that point. Texts of bilateral treaties
are also kept confidential until signed. Treaty Making Information Kit, supra note 173,
at Stages in the Development of Treaties. Finally, of course, in matters of extreme
urgency, the federal government can forego the tabling process, JSCOT Web site, supra
note 153, and consultation, see supra note 174 and accompanying text, altogether.
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and international obligations and perhaps usher in an era of "cooperative
federalism" in the United States.
C. Effect ofAustralian Reforms on Potential Federalism Limits to the
Treaty Power
Even if the federal government and state governments were to
cooperate and adopt the Australian reforms, there would still be the
judicial branch to consider. The U.S. legal environment is substantially
different from that in Australia. While the Australian High Court has
consistently favored the federal government's ability to make and
implement treaties, 200 the Supreme Court has applied limits to the U.S.
federal government's power in a variety of areas,20 1 and the treaty power
could be next. U.S. adoption of the Australian reforms, however, could
give the Court cause to hesitate in at least two instances.
Consider the Court's potential application of the
anticommandeering principle to treaty implementation. In New York, the
Court reasoned that the federal government should not be able to
commandeer state officials to carry out its directives because it confuses
citizens as to which political entity is responsible for them. 20 2 If this sort
of reasoning were applied in the treaty context, it would prohibit the
federal government from signing treaties where implementation is left to
the states because those treaties are federal acts that must be enforced by
state officials.20 3 With the Australian reforms in place, however, citizens
would have less cause for confusion as to who is politically accountable
for treaties because the publicly available NIAs and JSCOT reports
would indicate whether a treaty was favored by a state government or
was adopted despite state opposition.2 °4 This transparency, therefore,
200. See Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 42 (stating that
the High Court's "current position is that.., the mere acceptance of the treaty by
Australia is sufficient basis for the Commonwealth to rely on the terms of the treaty to
enact implementing legislation"); supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (limiting Congress's
authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause and section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that federal
legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause cannot require local officials to execute
federal laws).
202. 505 U.S. 144, 182-83 (1997).
203. See Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 432 (explaining how application
of the anticommandeering principle to the VCCR would, under Printz and New York,
prevent the federal government from requiring either (1) state officials to carry out
notifications or (2) states to adopt implementing legislation).
204. Treaty Making Information Kit, supra note 173, Introduction, Joint Standing
Committee on Treaties, The process of parliamentary review ("An NIA includes
information about.., the consultation that has occurred with [s]tate and [tierritory
Governments, industry and community groups and other interested parties."); see
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could give the Supreme Court a reason not to apply the anti-
commandeering principle to treaties.
Similarly, consider Bradley's suggestion that the Court should
overturn Holland.20 5  The Court's reasoning in Lopez and Morrison
would support this move. Just as the Court feared with the commerce
power, an unlimited treaty power could lead to an unchecked federal
police power 20 6 and federal interference in areas of traditional state
concern. 20 7 Adopting the Australian reforms could not decisively prevent
the federal government from ignoring state concerns and using its treaty
power abusively. If the reforms were adopted, however, the Court might
feel less compelled to provide the states legal protection because the
reforms already provide significant procedural and political protection
when a treaty implicates traditional areas of state concern. 0 8
The presence of these protections could also limit the consequences
of the Court's likely adoption of the state sovereign immunity doctrine in
the treaty context. While foreign nations would still be prevented from
suing states for treaty breaches, the federal government might feel
justified in suing to mend the breach because the offending state would
already have had an opportunity to consult on the treaty and would be
aware of its requirements. Furthermore, as previously discussed, if the
state had approved of the treaty during consultation, the federal
government would have a strong political justification for enforcing
compliance.
D. Practicality of Applying Australian Reforms in the United States
Although adopting Australian-style procedural reforms would
Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, at 4.2(c) (including states in the NIA
process); see also ATNIA, supra note 170, annex 1 (providing an example of the
inclusion of information on state consultations in an NIA); supra note 157 (providing
various examples of the inclusion of state information on state consultations in JSCOT
reports).
205. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
206. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) ("To uphold the Government's
contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would
bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States."); see also United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("'[Ilf we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate."' (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564)).
207. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 ("'Were the federal government to take over the
regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern... the boundaries between the
spheres of federal and state authority would blur....' (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577
(Kennedy, J., concurring))).
208. As indicated in the Principles and Procedures, the reforms are designed to "relate
to treaties of sensitivity and importance to the States and Territories." Principles and
Procedures, supra note 16, at 2.1.
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benefit both states and the federal government and would potentially
undermine the Supreme Court's reasons for applying additional
federalism limits, the reforms come with a degree of risk. First, they
have only been in place in Australia for a short time, and their long-term
success in that country is uncertain. Furthermore, it is impossible to
know what measures the Supreme Court might introduce to limit the
treaty power in the future. If the Court decides, even in the face of the
reforms, to prevent the federal government from enforcing treaties that
encroach on traditional areas of state concern, the Australian reforms
would do little to enable U.S. compliance with international law. In that
case, the reforms would only serve as an additional costly instrument
favoring state interests.
Even if the Court does not choose to limit the treaty power, these
types of procedural reforms can be prohibitively costly. For example,
although NEPA is frequently praised, the EISs have been criticized as
too expensive. 20 9 This could be a major concern because the Australian
reforms not only require EIS-like NIAs210 but also the distribution of
treaties under consideration 21' and the administration of the Treaties
Council, JSCOT, and the State Standing Committee. 2  That Australia
finds these reforms affordable 21 3 alleviates this concern to some extent in
the United States, but it is hard to predict whether U.S. budget-makers
will agree that the benefits are worth the costs.
Financial considerations, however, are only one aspect of a more
fundamental difficulty surrounding the adoption of the Australian
reforms in the United States: scale. Australia has only six states and two
territories; the U.S. has fifty states.2 14 This difference would increase
costs and bureaucracy. For example, in negotiating the Australia-United
States Free Trade Agreement, "[t]he [Australian Federal] Government
held meetings or teleconferences with representatives from all the [s]tate
and [t]erritory governments both before and after each of the six
negotiating rounds. 215 In the United States, similar consultations would
not only be significantly more expensive, but could potentially take
much longer. Of course, the U.S. federal government could easily
control undue delays by establishing a principle similar to the one built
209. Karkainnen, supra note 190, at 903 (generally criticizing the cost of EISs).
210. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 145-50, 155-60 and accompanying text.
213. Australia's federal government splits some of the costs with the states, which
bear the burden of funding state representatives in treaty delegations. Principles and
Procedures, supra note 16, at 6.3.
214. A stimulating conversation with Professor Gillian Triggs, University of
Melbourne, alerted me to a variety of concerns potentially caused by this difference.
215. ATNIA, supra note 170, annex 1.
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into the Australian reforms that prevents treaties from being stymied by
excessive state consultation.21 6
While the time problems of state consultation could be managed,
the scale of the United States would probably prohibit successful
integration of a Treaties Council. In Australia, the Prime Minister and
the Premiers from each state can comfortably fit around a table. In the
United States, a meeting between the President and fifty Governors could
not take the form of an intimate consultation. In fact, John Quincy
Adams wrote in his diary that it was the difficulties of consulting with a
similarly large group that caused President Washington to abandon the
practice of seeking Senate advice.217 After consulting in the Senate for
two days on the 1789 Treaty with the Creek Indians, Washington
supposedly said that "he would be damned if he ever went there
again.''218 It is hard to imagine a U.S. President agreeing to any such
consultation with the state Governors.
Conclusion
The practical problems of U.S. adoption of the Australian reforms
wholesale are significant. The United States could limit the severity of
those problems, however, by adopting only the most significant reforms:
namely, the NIAs, JSCOT reports, and the State Standing Committee.
The Treaties Council has not played a major role in Australia2'9 and,
because of the difficulties of consultation between the President and
Governors, is not really appropriate for the United States. Jettisoning the
Treaty Council would lessen some of the time and cost burdens of the
reforms and make them more palatable to the President.
The reforms would still be costly but no more so than other
proposals attempting to reconcile the tensions between international
obligations and federalism. Consider the remedy of allowing states to
form international agreements.220 As was mentioned previously, such a
system would require radical and costly restructuring of U.S. methods of
assigning state citizenship and passports,221 while providing states less
216. The Australian "Principles and Procedures" were "adopted subject to their
operation not being allowed to result in unreasonable delays in the negotiating, joining or
implementing of treaties by Australia." Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, Part A.
217. HAYDEN, supra note 56, at 23 n.4. (citing John Quincy Adams). Hayden explains
that Washington did submit later treaties to the Senate prior to negotiation but never
again made the submission orally. Id.
218. Id. Although this anecdote appears as a second hand account in John Quincy
Adams's journal, Hayden finds it credible because of corroboration in the diary of
Senator William Maclay. Id. at 23.
219. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 115-19 and accompanying text.
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protection from the federal government's treaty power than the
Australian reforms.
222
The potential benefits of creating a State Standing Committee,
establishing a JSCOT, and implementing NIAs are considerable. Not
only would the U.S. federal government have greater political legitimacy
to enforce state compliance with its international obligations, the states
would have the opportunity of consulting on any treaty touching state
concern, something not possible even under Bradley's vision of a court-
limited treaty power. The reforms would also contribute a degree of
transparency to U.S. treaty making, a process that has been derided as
lacking democratic legitimacy.223
This is not to say that adoption of these reforms would definitively
remedy the tensions between state concerns and international obligations.
The Supreme Court could still limit the treaty power to render federal
government enforcement of some international obligations impossible. It
is the reformation of the treaty process, however, that could give the
Court the incentive not to introduce those limits, which is what makes
the need for reform so pressing.
There is no question that a move to introduce a State Standing
Committee, a JSCOT, and NIAs to the U.S. treaty process would face
serious hurdles. The states would likely be pleased with such reform, as
at worst it would supplement potential legal protections. The President
and the Senate, however, would be certain to resist. Although Presidents
and Senators have frequently expounded on the virtues of states'
rights,224 it has been the trend for the political branches to attempt to
222. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
223. See e.g., Damrosch, supra note 195 ("The president-centered model has been
dominant since the days of President Washington, but in the more complex, globalized
world of the twenty-first century, the treaty process should not be a closed, secretive
preserve, as if the president were an eighteenth-century monarch with the Senate his
coterie of courtiers."); Catherine Powell, The Role of Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs
in the U.S. "War on Terrorism, " 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 47, 51 (2004) ("While
particular democratic deficits characterize lawmaking processes in the United States
generally, the problem is aggravated in the making and implementation of international
law. There is a lack of transparency in the international processes in which treaties are
negotiated as well as in the domestic processes in which treaties are ratified with input
only from the Senate and not from the House, unlike purely domestic legislation.")
(footnote omitted).
224. In 1999, President Clinton issued an executive order on federalism "to ensure
that the principles of federalism established by the Framers guide the executive
departments and agencies in the formulation and implementation of policies." Exec.
Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999). President George W. Bush has
also announced his commitment to the principles of federalism. See, e.g., President
George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at National Governors' Association Meeting
(Feb. 26, 2001) ("I'm going to make respect for federalism a priority in this
administration. Respect for federalism begins with an understanding of its philosophy.
The framers of the Constitution did not believe in an all-knowing, all-powerful federal
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expand their power, not give it up.225 Despite this rather significant
hurdle, however, adoption of treaty reform may be the only method for
the executive and legislative branches to protect their treaty power from
limitation by the Supreme Court.
Although state advice in the U.S. treaty process through a State
Standing Committee and NIAs would not precisely resemble the
Framers' vision of Senate consultation during treaty making, it would
successfully integrate states into the treaty- making process for the first
time since 1913. Furthermore, it would allow the federal government to
continue to support federalism without sacrificing treaty obligations. For
these reasons, lawmakers should consider the Australian reforms of the
State Standing Committee, JSCOT reports, and NIAs as they determine
how best to reconcile competing state and federal interests in the treaty-
making process.
government. They believed that our freedom is best preserved when power is dispersed.
That is why they limited and enumerated the federal government's powers, and reserved
the remaining functions of government to the states."), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/02/20010226-8.html (last visited June
20, 2005). Among Senators, Lamar Alexander has been particularly vocal, condemning
his fellow republicans and saying "[tihe principle of federalism has gotten lost in the
weeds by a Republican Congress that was elected to uphold it in 1994." James Dao, The
Nation: Rebellion of the States; Red, Blue and Angry All Over, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2005, at 41, available at 2005 WLNR 594669 (quoting Sen. Lamar Alexander).
225. Consider, for example, Professor Michael J. Gerhardt's historical
contextualization of President George W. Bush's expansion of executive branch power
under the USA Patriot Act and in the environmental realm: "With every effort he takes as
President to consolidate executive power, he merely reinforces the growth of the
executive branch and particularly executive power that is a legacy of the New Deal."
Michael J. Gerhardt, On Revolution and Wetland Regulations, 90 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2171
(2002). Or consider, "the growing use by Congress of its legislative powers under the
Commerce Clause to expand its criminal authority," Andrew St. Laurent, Reconstituting
United States v. Lopez: Another Look at Federal Criminal Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 61, 108-09 (1997), even at a time when the crime rate was declining. Gerald G.
Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 789,
806-07 (1996).
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